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I. INTRODUCTION 
Classic patent theory relies on an incentive model to justify the 
grant of exclusionary patent rights.
1
  Under the model, potential pa-
tent rights provide an incentive to those who would set about the task 
of innovating.  In constitutional language, this incentive operates to 
“promote the progress” in the “useful arts.”2  Patents are only one 
tool of innovation policy, and we regularly find innovation even in 
the absence of any direct governmental sponsorship or activity.
3
  In 
this essay, I focus on the role of patents in relation to a potential 
global crisis such as an influenza pandemic or other public health cri-
sis. 
Part II considers the reality that patent rights will be largely ig-
nored during an epidemic and that any post-crisis compensation 
would likely be low when compared to traditional patent rewards or 
settlements entered under threat of injunctive relief.  In some situa-
tions, such as use of a patented invention by a state or local govern-
ment, a patentee may have no recourse.
4
  Part III raises a separate is-
sue that stems from the relatively long time frame for obtaining 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. This paper is 
adapted from a speech delivered at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing 
for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza.  See Dennis Crouch, Intellec-
tual Property in a Public Health Crisis, PATENTLY-O, Oct. 22, 2008, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/intellectual-pr.html.  Special thanks to 
Patently-O blog readers who provided often anonymous comments on my original 
topic outline. 
 1 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11–12 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the 
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–
30 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 266 (1977) (incentive to invent). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
 4 See infra notes 28–32. 
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patent rights as compared with the time frame of an epidemic.  Pa-
tent rights are only obtained through the typically slow process of pa-
tent prosecution.  Consequently, innovation triggered by the onset of 
an epidemic might not be protected by patent rights until well after 
the crisis has abated. This realization suggests that the role of patents 
rests with longer-term preparation and follow-up, rather than with 
protecting innovations triggered by the specific crisis itself.  Part IV 
considers how these diminished patent rights alter the incentive to 
innovate.  As foreshadowed, I conclude that patent rights offer little 
innovation incentive in the face of an impending crisis.  Optimistical-
ly, under this same formulation, patents may provide an incentive to 
ensure that the crisis is never realized.  Part V recognizes that innova-
tion still takes place in the absence of enforceable patent rights.  A 
wide variety of incentives play a role in producing innovation, and 
reduced patent value does not mean that innovation will end or nec-
essarily be reduced.  I suggest that the absence of strong patent rights 
may well be good for crisis policy. 
For brevity, this essay primarily focuses on treatment of practical 
and legal issues within the borders of the United States.  The title of 
the essay, “Nil,” is a bald overstatement, although some nuance is re-
quired before discovering the value of patents in a global crisis such 
as an influenza pandemic.  With hope, the value comes in helping to 
generate innovations that aid in preparing for these crises and pre-
vent such crises from ever being realized. 
II. PATENTS AS NON-ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS DURING AN EPIDEMIC 
The political reality is easy to understand.  Governments have 
taken significant steps to combat health crises in the past, and will not 
avoid the temptation to ignore patent rights when an underlying in-
novation is needed to respond to a crisis such as a health related epi-
demic.
5
  I postulate a formula—that during a public health crisis the 
government will ignore any patent rights if (1) the patented technol-
 
 5 See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding as con-
stitutional a Massachusetts law authorizing a city or town to make smallpox vaccina-
tions mandatory for all residents); Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the Constitution, 
and Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 185, 186–204 (2008) (evaluating 
the scope of government authority to protect from a public health emergency); 
Christopher T. Nidel, Public Health, Hypocrisy, and Brown-Skinned People, 59 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 355 (2004) (discussing the ability of sovereign governments to use their 
police powers to remove private rights to combat a public health crisis); J. Kelly 
Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 435 (1994) (discussing government actions to criminalize activities which in-
crease the threat of HIV exposure). 
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ogy will aid in resolving the crisis and (2) a favorable license is not 
readily available.  In the United States, the Supreme Court arguably 
endorsed such a doctrine in its 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, LLC.
6
  EBay formalized the notion that a court must consider 
the public impact before issuing an injunction to block infringing ac-
tivities.
7
  Before eBay, injunctive relief was regularly awarded as a mat-
ter of course once the patentee proved infringement of a valid pa-
tent. Yet, in those heady days of strong exclusionary rights, public 
health concerns could still be sufficient to lead a court away from is-
suing injunctive relief.
8
  For example, in City of Milwaukee v. Activated 
Sludge, Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied the patentee’s request for in-
junctive relief, even though the patent had been deemed valid and 
infringed.
9
  According to the court, the proposed relief of shutting 
down the infringing sewage treatment process would have wreaked 
too much havoc on the public interest: 
If . . . the injunction ordered by the trial court is made permanent 
in this case, it would close the sewage plant, leaving the entire 
community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage oth-
er than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its water 
and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining 
communities. . . . [W]here, as here, the health and the lives of 
more than a half a million people are involved, we think no risk 
should be taken, and we feel impelled to deny appellee’s conten-
tion.
10
 
 
 6 See 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 7 See id. at 391; see also Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma: When 
Patents Conflict with Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, ¶¶ 71–127 (2007), 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol12/issue4/v12i4_a1-Burger.pdf (suggesting mechanisms for 
extending the public interest factor); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness 
in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2131 (2009) (suggesting that the 
public interest factor is treated as a narrowly applied “safety valve”). 
 8 See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 
1934). 
 9 Id.  
 10 Id. Ethicists and theologians have argued that a patent holder is ethically obli-
gated to open access to needed inventions during special emergencies. See Gabriel J. 
Michael, Catholic Thought and Intellectual Property: Learning from the Ethics of Obligation, 
25 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming Spring 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349769. Beyond ethics, in a true major public health cri-
sis, it is unlikely that a company with an ongoing business interest—especially a 
pharmaceutical company with close governmental-regulatory ties—would seek in-
junctive relief unless the patentee was convinced that it could supply the entire mar-
ket without complaints of access.  In line with this rule of marketing, some patentee 
litigants have elected to request only continuing damages for ongoing infringement 
rather than seeking permanent injunctive relief. For instance, in a suit charging Eli 
Lilly with infringement for the sale of its osteoporosis drug Evista, the plaintiffs only 
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City of Milwaukee is an older case.  A more recent example directly re-
lated to health epidemics involved Bayer’s patent on Ciprofloxicin 
(“Cipro”).11  In 2001, Congress and President George W. Bush’s ad-
ministration were reported to have seriously considered “breaking” 
Bayer’s patent on Cipro in order to stockpile the drug against a po-
tential anthrax attack.
12
  Instead, the federal government reportedly 
used the threat of breaking the patent to negotiate a long-term con-
tract with Bayer at an unusually low price.
13
  This approach might be 
termed “bending” the patent, as discussed below. 
The Cipro case is important because it may help define the am-
biguous terms “crisis” and “epidemic” within political realities.  The 
“crisis” in the Cipro case was not an immediate need for medication 
to treat affected persons, but was instead a desire to stockpile medica-
tion in preparation for a potential threat.  In the end, the threat did 
not materialize and no stockpile was necessary.  In hindsight it ap-
pears that the crisis, like many health crises of the past, was primarily 
a political crisis.
14
  The Cipro case also helps reflect on the notion 
that, in order to avoid a “broken” patent, the offered license must be 
favorable for the government.
15
 
None of the reported post-eBay injunctive relief decisions involve 
either governmental infringement or a potential crisis-like need.  Yet, 
even without those indicators, courts have denied injunctive relief in 
 
sought “monetary damages, including but not limited to a reasonable royalty for De-
fendant Lilly’s current and future infringement.”  Complaint at 2, Ariad Pharms., 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2005) (No. 02-cv-11280), 2002 
WL 33027597.  
 11 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (discussing the patent in relation to allegedly anticompetitive settlement 
agreements), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009). 
 12 Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of Compen-
sation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 126–27 
(2002). 
 13 Id. at 127.  
 14 Cf. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 393–95 
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing the political background of the 1976 swine flu immuniza-
tion program); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE EPIDEMIC THAT 
NEVER WAS: POLICY-MAKING AND THE SWINE FLU SCARE 27–28 (rev. ed., Vintage Books 
1983) (1982) (same); N. Pieter M. O’Leary, Bioterrorism or Avian Influenza: California, 
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, and Protecting Civil Liberties During a Public 
Health Emergency, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 249, 280–85 (2006) (discussing specific limits in a 
proposed California Emergency Health Powers Act that may limit political overreach-
ing). 
 15 Admittedly, external factors such as regulatory capture or governmental lea-
dership ineffectiveness may alter this outcome and provide an avenue for a patentee 
to negotiate more favorable agreements. 
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a substantial number of recent cases.
16
  In z4 Techs, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., for instance, the Court refused to grant the patentee an injunc-
tion to stop Microsoft from continuing to infringe its software pa-
tent.
17
  In Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the patentee was refused an 
injunction to stop Toyota from continuing to infringe.
18
  In both cas-
es, relief was denied primarily because (1) the patentees failed to 
prove that continued infringement caused any irreparable harm and 
(2) injunctive relief would have been burdensome because the pa-
tented invention implicated only small portions of much larger 
products.
19
  The courts here are not completely devaluing the patent 
right, but their denial of permanent relief shifts the situation from 
one in which strong property rules are applied to a regime of liability 
rules.
20
 
I should take a moment here to define my terms of “breaking” 
and “bending” patents.  A patent’s underlying value is in its legal and 
apparent exclusionary power.  A “broken” patent might be defined as 
a patent whose rights are willfully ignored without recourse.  A patent 
that is merely “bent” may have only suffered under the threat of be-
 
 16 See cases cited infra note 18. 
 17 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440–41, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
 18 No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in 
part, vacated on other grounds, 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also, Dennis 
Crouch, Injunction Granted to TiVo; Injunction Denied in Favor of Toyota, PATENTLY-O, 
Aug. 18, 2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/08/injunction_gran.html.  
For other recent cases where permanent injunctive relief has been denied, see Ar-
mando v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Innogenetics, N.V. v. Ab-
bott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009); Voile Mfg. Corp. v. Dandurand, 551 F. Supp. 2d 
1301 (D. Utah 2008) (preliminary injunction denied); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007); IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. 
Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007) (denied without prejudice); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte 
Fabricating, Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007); Finisar 
Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. 
Tex. July 7, 2006); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
37961 (W.D. Okla. June 8, 2006).    
 19 z4Techs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Paice, LLC, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4–5. 
 20 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119–20 (1972). Injunc-
tive relief is generally considered a higher value reward than ongoing monetary 
damages.  See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007). In essence, injunctive relief puts full control of the 
intellectual property in the hands of the patentee who is then in a strong position to 
name a settlement price or even to refuse to settle. There is no settled theory for cal-
culating ongoing damages for patent infringement. See Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313–15 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(suggesting one method for calculat-
ing such damages).  Thus, it is possible that a proper ongoing damage calculation 
would actually be greater than the potential settlement price. 
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ing broken or perhaps is only partially broken.  In the context of this 
paper, the breaking and bending of patents is assumed to occur by, 
or on behalf of, governmental entities.
21
  Because the United States 
government has largely waived its rights of sovereign immunity and 
allows private patent holders to sue the government for infringe-
ment,
22
 the government is unlikely to break patents entirely. 
Allegations of patent infringement against the federal govern-
ment must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), which 
imposes procedural requirements that limit some of the potential pa-
tent rights available.
23
  The CFC does not offer a right to jury trial, 
disallows injunctive relief, disallows enhanced or punitive damages 
for willful infringement of patent rights, disallows relief for some 
would-be infringing activities, and eliminates the potential for actions 
against private contractors authorized to infringe by the federal gov-
ernment.
24
 Section 1498 provides the only practical mechanism for 
pursuing actions against the federal government; other legal mechan-
isms, such as takings claims, have been largely unsuccessful.
25
  Courts 
do not ordinarily consider patent infringement by the government to 
be an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment.
26
 Al-
though the term ‘compulsory license’ is not used in the statute, these 
limitations on rights allow the federal government to bend patent 
rights by declaring a compulsory license to use patented inventions 
without first obtaining any rights. 
 
 21 The assumption that breaking patents is restricted to governmental activities is 
not necessary for the arguments, but it merely simplifies the issues treated in the pa-
per.  Although not directly parallel, Mark Lemley rightly suggests that private entities 
ignore many patent rights.  Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
19, 21 (2008). 
 22 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006). 
 23 Id. § 1498(a), (b), (e). 
 24 Id; see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 25 See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353; Cahoy, supra note 12, at 175.  Furthermore, during 
a crisis, ordinary takings principles do not apply as the government applies police 
power to achieve its public purposes.  See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268 (1870); 
Teresi v. California, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517, 518–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
damages resulting from a police-power response to an extreme emergency are ex-
cepted from the constitutional requirement that compensation be paid for property 
taken for public use); In re N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, 505 A.2d 177, 182, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1986) (emergency measures enacted to protect public health did not con-
stitute a taking); Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for Environmental 
Purposes: The Takings Implications of Government-Authorized Aerial Pesticide Spraying, 18 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 88–93 (1999). 
 26 Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353. 
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Individual states may also apply pressure and threaten unautho-
rized use.
27
  In fact, for several reasons, the threat of patent breaking 
by individual states is heightened.  First, states generally have not 
waived their sovereign immunity against patent infringement ac-
tions.
28
  State immunity from suit derives from the Eleventh Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution, which protects states from “[t]he Judi-
cial power of the United States.”29  The Supreme Court has held that 
state immunity goes beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment and 
is also rooted in “the structure of the original Constitution itself.”30  
In Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, the 
Supreme Court held that states may assert sovereign immunity as a 
defense against charges of patent infringement.
31
  In addition to sove-
reign immunity, practical considerations may also push state and lo-
cal governments away from providing compensation for use of a pa-
tented invention.  Less money is available. State and local budgets are 
dramatically lower than those of the federal government.  Additional-
ly, unlike the federal government, state and local governments often 
abide by strict budgeting principles.
32
 
The governing international agreement—the Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)—includes additional 
provisions that legitimize patent breaking in limited circumstances 
such as a national emergency.  When this occurs, TRIPS indicates 
 
 27 See infra notes 28–32. 
 28 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 635 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Propor-
tionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 
472 (1999); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a 
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of 
State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1401 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual 
Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2000); Ernest A Young, State Sovereign Immunity 
and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13–16 (1999).  
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; State Sovereign Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 
and its Effects on Intellectual Property Enforcement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
and Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement 
of Q. Todd Dickinson, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office),  avail-
able at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106s/dickinson0727.htm.  
 30 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999). 
 31 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 647–48 (1999).  Although Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908), provides a 
limited exception to the state immunity doctrine by allowing plaintiffs to sue state 
officials for injunctive relief rather than suing the state itself, that doctrine has seen 
little success in modern patent cases. 
 32 Michael Abramowicz, Speeding the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 158 
(2003).  As a practical matter, innovations that could be easily replicated in a decen-
tralized fashion would be locally without recourse. 
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that the patentee should eventually receive some compensation based 
on “the economic value of the authorization.”33  In all likelihood, 
however, that ex-post payment will be a small fraction of the potential 
monopoly profits that could have been earned.
34
 
The bottom line here is that—in an emergent crisis—
government entities will likely have both the legal right and political 
mandate to bend if not break patent rights over innovations deemed 
important in resolving the crisis. 
III. THE NON-CRISIS TIME FRAME OF PATENTS 
Time Frame of the innovation and patenting processes also mat-
ter.  In many likely scenarios, the crisis may pass before patent rights 
become available.  Patent protection is not automatic.  Rather, it in-
volves a substantive examination process that often takes years.
35
  This 
delay in perfecting rights is relevant when considering the role of pa-
tent rights during a crisis such as a health epidemic.  In cases where 
innovation is spurred by the crisis itself, the innovator may have only 
fleeting hope of quickly obtaining patent protection.
36
  This situation 
is quite likely to arise in a health crisis where anti-viral or anti-
microbial treatments are engineered only after isolating the offensive 
biologic agent.
37
 
 
 33 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 31 includes sev-
eral specific limits on when a country can issue compulsory licenses of privately held 
patents.  For instance, each use must be considered on its individual merit, efforts 
must be made to obtain authorization from the rights holder, the use should be pre-
dominantly for the domestic market of the authorizing member nation, and the 
compulsory use must be revoked when it is no longer needed. 
 34 Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Property in a Public Health Crisis, PATENTLY-O, Oct. 22, 
2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/intellectual-pr.html.  
 35 In a 2009 study of 20,000+ prosecution history files, I found that more than fif-
ty percent of patent applications are still pending three-years after filing.  See Dennis 
Crouch, Patent Application Pendency: Percent of Applications Still Pending, PATENTLY-O, 
July 17, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/patent-application-
pendency-percent-of-applications-still-pending.html.  In addition, most patents ac-
tually claim priority to one or more priority documents such as prior patent applica-
tions, foreign patent applications, or provisional patent applications.  See Dennis 
Crouch, Priority Claims in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O, July 26, 2009, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/priority-claims-in-issued-patents.html.  
These successive filings further add to the pendency period.  Time is also required to 
prepare patent application materials before filing, thus further pushing back the 
eventual effective date of the issued patent.  
 36 See supra note 35.  
 37 This is the procedure used annually to create the influenza vaccine.  See Audio 
recording: Matthew Reynolds, Centers for Disease Control, 2007–2008 Influenza 
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During pendency of the application, the applicant has no right 
to stop would-be infringement.  A limited statutory provision does 
provide “provisional rights” and back damages after issuance,38 but 
that provision is so narrowly drafted that ten years after its 1999 pas-
sage, a comprehensive online search failed to reveal a single reported 
decision indicating that an infringer had been held liable for provi-
sional damages.
39
 
The timing of a crisis could be weeks, months, or potentially 
years.  That timing makes a difference in patent law.  In the same way 
that light waves act differently around objects whose size is on the 
same order as the light wavelength,
40
 patent law only becomes appli-
cable if a patent may issue before the crisis is complete.  Before the 
patent issues, the invention may be used without recourse under the 
patent laws.  Even after issuance, however, infringers do not simply 
pay their share of compensation.  Patent litigation typically consumes 
years and, as discussed above, high value awards of injunctive relief 
would be unlikely in the midst of a crisis. 
IV. THE INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE OFFERED BY PATENT LAW  
IN A CRISIS SITUATION 
Parts II and III developed the notion that innovators will have 
diminished or even nonexistent patent rights during a public health 
crisis situation.  This part briefly considers how these diminished pa-
tent rights alter the incentive to innovate.  Patent law operates under 
the assumption that the promise of strong patent rights provides an 
incentive to innovate.
41
  If the law offers weaker rights, a potential in-
novator will presumably feel marginally less inclined to pursue the 
innovation.  Following that premise, we expect that the reduced 
strength of patent rights during a public health crisis would likely re-
 
Vaccine Production and Distribution, available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/podcasts/ 
download.asp?f=6678&af=t.  
 38 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2006). 
 39 To conduct this study, I broadly searched for mention of the provisional rights 
statute in the federal case law databases of LexisNexis and Westlaw.  I also performed 
a parallel search using the Lexmachina docket search database.  In one case, a dis-
trict court denied a pretrial motion to preclude a plaintiff from seeking provisional 
rights. First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70482, at *6 (W.D. Wisc., Sept. 17, 2008).  However, that case settled before the court 
made any further substantive ruling.    
 40 DAVID BREWSTER, A TREATISE ON OPTICS 95 (London, Longman, Rees, Orme, 
Brown & Green 1831), available at http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=opYAAAAAMAAJ. 
 41 Dennis Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common 
Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 141 (2008). 
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duce the incentive to innovate targeted solutions.  As I discuss in a 
recently published paper on the patent lottery effect, the exact rela-
tionship between potential rights and incentive to innovate is difficult 
to define.
42
  Thus, although it is well established that patent rights 
create an incentive to invent, no one knows the exact incentive im-
pact of shifts in the strength of patent rights.  However, despite chal-
lenges to the assumption of incentives, the general theory has largely 
sat well with its commentators for hundreds of years. 
Although patent rights may fail to provide full incentives to de-
velop responses to an epidemic, I am cautiously optimistic that pa-
tents do have some role in preparing for a crisis.  The loss of rights de-
scribed in Parts II and III results from either the critical public need 
for access to the invention during a major crisis or the short timeline 
of the crisis.  Patents can still provide a strong incentive to create in-
novations that help prepare for and prevent potential crises, since 
governments are less likely to upset patent rights outside of the crisis 
situation.
43
  Thus, the remaining incentive pushes innovators toward 
mechanisms that prevent the crisis from forming in the first place. 
V. INNOVATION WILL HAPPEN: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES  
TO CRISIS INNOVATION 
This section briefly considers alternative approaches to crisis in-
novation.  A simple model of the decision to innovate considers the 
additional value of the various incentives and disincentives.  A tre-
mendous amount of innovation occurs without any external stimulus 
or incentive.
44
  As discussed above, in some situations, patents can 
provide additional incentives.  Ordinarily, patent rights help prevent 
free riding by follow-on copycats, thus allowing the patentee to gen-
erate revenue based on the innovation.  At times, patentees can use 
contract rights to achieve the same result.  Notably, rights can be con-
trolled through contracts such as confidentiality agreements and ma-
 
 42 Id.  
 43 Some patents that would be potentially useful in a crisis may have non-crisis 
uses that are substantial enough to provide innovators incentive to invest in research 
and development.  Cipro and oseltamivir phosphate (Tamiflu) are two such exam-
ples.  In those cases, the innovation may still be developed despite an understanding 
that the patent rights may be ignored in a crisis situation.  The crisis value could be 
seen as a spillover benefit.  
 44 This natural innovation might be seen as simply human nature, since many 
humans are naturally innovative and enjoy the process. 
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terial transfer agreements (MTAs).
45
  In some areas of technology, 
these contractual rights can be quite strong especially where the in-
novation is difficult and expensive to reproduce.
46
  For instance, Pro-
fessor O’Connor identifies MTAs as particularly strong in stem cell 
research because the value is in the stem cell line itself, rather than in 
the idea of how to create a stem cell: 
The recent focus on patents as a hindrance to stem cell research 
may turn out to be a red herring. The real culprits are material 
transfer agreements (MTAs), which govern the transfer of cell 
lines and other biological materials. The MTA’s primary purpose 
in life sciences research is to set contractual rights and obligations 
between parties where one party transfers biological materials to 
the other. For example, MTAs often focus on the physical han-
dling, use, and distribution of the materials by the recipient, en-
suring that the recipient complies with regulations for research 
involving humans or animals. Although these interests are legiti-
mate, evidence indicates that owners of important biological re-
search materials use their nonpatent property rights to require 
recipient consent to arguably onerous MTAs, which include pro-
visions governing intellectual property rights (IPR). When an in-
tended recipient’s institution refuses to sign the MTA, the re-
searcher cannot access the biological materials, and in some cases 
cannot pursue her research.47 
A surprising study recently confirmed the power of the MTAs when it 
determined that MTAs and confidentiality agreements create more of 
a hindrance to agricultural research than opposing patent rights.
48
 
In crisis preparation, the greatest incentive may come from di-
rect government support through public funding of research and 
emergency preparations.  This managed innovation makes sense in 
the absence of patent rights, but even if patents were largely enforce-
able, we might not expect that innovators would necessarily choose to 
invest in crisis preparation.  In this context, the problem with the pa-
tent regime is that it broadly offers a promise of rights without direct-
ing innovators toward any particular area of innovation.  Thus, al-
 
 45 See generally Sean O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of Stem 
Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2006) (discussing the 
use of MTAs as a source of property protection). 
 46 See id. at 1017–18. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications 
of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36 
(2009), available at http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v27/n1/pdf/nbt0109-
36.pdf; see also Posting of Kevin Noonan to Patent Docs, http://www.patentdocs.org 
(Feb. 3, 2009, 11:38 p.m.) (critiquing the study conclusions). 
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though patents may serve as useful tools for generally fueling innova-
tion, the broad range of potentially protectable subject matter means 
that any one particular innovation remains unlikely.  Even if mono-
poly-level returns could be expected for a patentee whose innovation 
aided in solving a major crisis, there is no guarantee that a potential 
innovator would take the risk, especially after taking into account the 
low probability that the planned-for crisis would occur. 
In addition to providing up-front funding, the government may 
also provide prior contracts and guarantees that rights will not be vi-
olated even in a crisis.  Where forethought is possible, a cooperative 
agreement could guarantee public access to innovative products and 
guarantee that developers are repaid.  If this solution is done through 
a statutory or regulatory framework, it may be necessary to do so 
through federal action because of the preemptive nature of the pa-
tent laws.
49
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Potential patent rights fail to provide a strong incentive to inno-
vate solutions to a potential major crisis such as a health epidemic.  In 
some cases, patent rights may spur innovation that prevents a crisis 
altogether.  In other cases, however, more directed management will 
be necessary. 
 
 
 49 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) 
(holding that Florida statute providing “patent-like protection for ideas deemed un-
protected under the present federal scheme” was preempted by the Supremacy 
Clause).  
